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LIEN OF JUDGMENTS OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN
WASHINGTON.
T common law pecuniary judgments and decrees do not become
a lien, i the modern sense of the term, on property of the debtor,
so that that effect is a statutory creation. Therefore, whether a judg-
ment is a lien, how made so, to what interest or estate the lien attaches,
when the lien commences, how long it endures, and all other particulars
must be ascertained from the statutes of the proper jurisdiction.'
The fixation of the force and effect of judgments and decrees of
courts is an attribute of sovereignty 2 The United States and the
several states being sovereignties, each has the power, within con-
stitutional limitations, to declare that judgments of its own courts
shall be a lien on the debtor's property within its jurisdiction, to pre-
scribe the procedure therefor and all other particulars; and, of course,
no one of these sovereignties can infringe upon this right of the others.3
So it is within the power of Congress to impart to judgments and
decrees of federal courts effect as a lien, wholly and absolutely inde-
pendent of and without regard to the laws of any state ;4 and, therefore,
Congress can provide that such judgments and decrees shall be a lien
on the debtor's property in any state notvithstanding that judgments
of the courts of the state do not so operate.5 Indeed, Congress can, if
it desires, give to judgments of federal courts consequences uniform
throughout the United States.
Instead, however of enacting a law of that character, Congress has
elected from the foundation of the government to pursue a policy
of conforming the operative effect of pecuniary judgments and decrees
of the federal courts in each state to that given by the law of the
Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 13 Sup. Ct. 340, 37 L. ed. 209 (1893), Mor-
sell v. First vat. Bk., 91 U. S. 357, 23 L. ed. 436 (1875) United States v.
Kendall, 263 Fed. 126 (1920), McAfee v. Reynolds, 130 Ind. 33, 38, 28 N. E.
423, 30 Am. St. Rep. 194, 18 L. R. A. 5-11 (1891), Noe v. Moutray, 170 Ill. 169,
176, 48 N. E. 709 (1897), In. re Jackson Light ' Traction Co., 5265 Fed. 389
(1919), aff'd 269 Fed. 223 (1920).2 Corwin v. Benham, 92 Oh. St. 37 (1853).
C ooke v. Avery, note 1, supra; Blair v. Ostrander, 109 Ia. 204, 80 N. W
330, 77 Am. St. Rep. 532, 47 L. R. A. 469 (1899) Corwzin v. Benham, note -0,
supra; Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546 (1890), Ward v. Chamber-
lam, 02 Black 430, 17 L. ed. 319 (1863).
'See cases note 3, supra.
5 Bock Island Nat. B. v. Thompson, 173 Ill. 593, 50 N. E. 1089, 64 Am. St.
Rep. 137 (1898), Wayma v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253 (1825), Bank
v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 6 L. ed. 064 (1825).
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state to like judgments and decrees of its own courts of general juris-
diction. 6 This policy originated with the Act of September 24, 1789,
chapter 20,' and conformity in the particular mentioned was estab-
lished by section 34 thereof which declares:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Consti-
tution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States
where they apply.""
This law was temporary, expiring by its terms at the end of the
next session after which it was passed, but the policy so initiated was
adhered to in the succeeding Act of May 8, 1792, chapter 36' This
was followed by the Act of May 19, 1828, chapter 68,10 the third
section of which declares,
"that writs of execution and other final process issued on
judgments and decrees rendered in any of the courts of the
United States, and the proceedings thereon, shall be the same,
except in their style, in each state, respectively, as are now
used in the courts of such state."
Successive decisions of courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, held that the first two acts, usually called Process
Acts, made the laws of each state "rules of decision" in respect of the
lien of judgments and decrees of federal courts, and the Act of May
19, 1828, was deemed to have been passed to confirm those decisions."
In other words, it was the view that Congress, in passing the afore-
said several laws, adopted the law of each state in regard to the lien
of judgments of its courts and made the same applicable to judg-
ments of federal courts within the state, so that the judgment of a
federal court became a lien on the debtor's property in all cases and
under like circumstances as if rendered in a court of the state. 2  A
question existing whether the state law fixing the duration of the
lien was included among the state laws adopted, Congress, in settle-
, Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra; Baker v. Morton, 12 Wall. 150, 20
L. ed. 269 (1871).
Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra.
'Rev. Stat. § 721, U. S. Comp. St., (1916) § 1538.
Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra.
"Ward v. Cha'mberlain, note 3, supra.
"Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. 44, 10 L. ed.
60 (1839) Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 9 L. ed. 158 (1635).
"Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra; Baker v. Morton, note 6, supra,
Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. ed. 134 (1868) Williams v. Benedict, 8
How. 107, 12 L. ed. 1007 (1850) Barth v. Makeever 9 Fed. Cas. No. 1,069
(1868) Cropsey v. Crandall, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,418 (1851) Koning V. Bayard,
14 Fed. Cas. No. 7,924 (1829) Lombard v. Bayard, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,469
(1849) Shrew v. Jones, -2 Fed. Cas. No. 12,818 (1840).
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ment thereof, passed the Act of July 4, 1840, chaper 43,13 which
declares judgments and decrees of federal courts within any state shall
cease to be liens in the same manner and at like periods as judgments
and decrees of the courts of such state shall cease to be under the
law of the state. Thus the law of each state governing the duration
of the lien of judgments of its courts was adopted and applied to the
lien of judgments of United States courts within the state.
The laws of the several states have not been and are not uniform
in regard to the lien of judgments of the state courts.14  Judgments
are not liens in some states, but are in others. Where they are, gen-
erally the lien extends throughout the jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering the judgment, usually a county, and provision is made for
extension of the lien to other counties.' 5 Furthermore, the statutes
generally require that judgments of courts of the state, in order to be
effective as a lien in any county, be registered, recorded, docketed,
enrolled, indexed, or other entry be made by a designated county
official in some book or record in his office in such county. 16 Neither
Congress nor the courts has power to require these state officials to
perform like functions with respect to judgments of federal courts,17
and there have been and are no United States officers in every county
to perform such duties."" Prior to the Act of August 1, 1888, here-
inafter referred to, these state laws were held inapplicable to judg-
ments of federal courts, since they would operate to restrict the juris-
diction of those courts by confining the lien of their judgments to
the county in which rendered, and thereby give to suitors in the
state courts a preference, because they would be able to extend the
lien of their judgments to other counties in the mode prescribed by
the state law, which suitors in the federal courts could not do. The
rule was, therefore, adopted of making the judgment of a federal
court a lien throughout the jurisdiction of that court without regard
3U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1608; 4 Fed. Stat. Ann (9 ed.) p. 606; Ward
v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra.
'"Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, note 3, supra.
"See state statutes; Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Rates, note 3, supra.
"See state statutes; 34 C. J. 576, § 885; Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates,
note 3, supra.
ITCropsey v. Crandall, note 1, supra; Shrew v. Jones, note 19, supra;
Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, note 3, supra; Lineker v. Dillon, 975 Fed.
460, 473 (1921).
uDarthmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, note 3, supra.
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to county lines.19 This rule gave suitors in the federal courts a
preference over those in state courts as to the territorial extent of
judgment lien, and worked a hardship on the public generally The
mass of the people were accustomed to rely on the records in that
office in the county, where the state law required records of judgments
to be kept, as disclosing all judgments which were liens on property
in the county, and were ignorant of the different rule applying to, and
of the wide extent of, the liens of federal court judgments. The
result was many persons who bought and paid for land on the faith
of what the county records showed, afterwards lost their land by
reason of an execution sale thereof in satisfaction of the lien of a
judgment rendered by a federal court in some other county, often at
a great distance from the county in which the land was situated. 0
To obviate these hardships and to put suitors in state and federal
courts on an equal footing in respect to the territorial extent of the
lien of their judgments in so far as Congress could do so, Congress
passed the Act of August 1, 1888, chapter 729.21 As originally
enacted it read as follows:22
"Section 1. The judments and decrees rendered in a cir-
cuit or district court of the United States within any state,
shall be liens on property throughout such state in the same
manner and to the same extent and under the same conditions
only as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction of such state: Provided, that
whenever the laws of any State require a judgment or de-
cree of a State court to be registered, recorded, docketed,
indexed, or any other thing to be done, in a particular man-
ner, or in a certain office or county, or parish in the State
of Louisiana before a lien shall attach, this act shall be
applicable therein whenever and only whenever the laws
of such state shall authorize the judgments and decrees of
the United States courts to be registered, recorded, docketed,
"9 Ward v. Chamberlain, note 3, supra; Cropsey v. Crandall, note 12, supra;
Shrew v. Jones, note 12, supra, Rock Island Nat. Bk. v. Thompson, note 5,
supra; Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, note 3, supra, Massingill v. Downs, 7
How. 760, 120 L. ed. 903 (1849) Ludlow v. Clinton Line R. Co., 1 Flip. 25, 15
Fed. Cas. No. 8,600 (1861) Lineker v. Dillon, note 17, sapra, Metcalf v. Water-
town, 153 U. S. 671, 678, 14 Sup. Ct. 947, 38 L. ed. 861 (1894) Conard v.
Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 7 L. ed. 189 (1828) Barth v. Makeever note 12,
supra; Carroll v. Watkins, o Fed. Cas. No. 2,457 (1870) United States v.
Duncan, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,003 (1850) United States v. Scott, 27 Fed. Cas.
No. 16,2042 (1878) Lombard v. Bayard, note 12, supra.
"Dartmouth Savings Bk. v. Bates, note 3, supra, Lineker v. Dillon, note
17, supra.
I U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1606; 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2 ed.) p. 608.
=Subsequent changes in this act are hereinafter fully presented and dis-
cussed.
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indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and require-
ments relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts
of the state.
"Section 2. That the clerks of the several courts of the
United States shall prepare and keep in their respective
offices complete and convenient indices and cross-indices of
the judgment records of said courts, and such indices and
records shall at all times be open to the inspection and
examination of the public.
"Section 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to re-
quire the docketing of a judgment or decree of a United
States court, or the filing of a transcript thereof, in any
state office within the same county or parish in the State
of Louisana in which the judgment or decree is rendered, in
order that such judgment or decree may be a lien on any
property within such county."
In passing this law Congress adhered to its historical and consistent
policy of conforming federal to state court judgments in each state.
The first clause of section 1 (down to the word "Provided,") merely
declared in express words the rule to be that which it theretofore
had been determined to be by implication from the Process Acts. But
the rest of section 1 established a new rule, and sought a greater
measure of conformity. While, as heretofore stated, neither Con-
gress nor the courts could make the state mode or system of recording
or docketing judgments applicable to judgments of United States
courts, yet Congress could give consent to its application and any
state could avail itself thereof to make its system apply. This is the
policy underlying the provisions of this federal act, more particularly
the proviso in section 1. The Act does not authorize or permit a
state to prescribe a system for the creation and evidencing of the liens
of judgments of federal courts different from that prescribed for liens
of judgments of the state's own courts. No discrimination is to be
permitted. 23  Nor is the effect as liens of judgments and decrees of
United States courts in any state made to depend on compliance by
any state with the condition in the proviso. "-4  If it were, then a
state could, by refusing to enact a law of the character mentioned in
the proviso, prevent judgments of federal courts from being a lien
notwithstanding state court judgments had that result.
Section 1 is inclusive of all judgments and decrees of United States
courts which have effect as liens. But section 3 created an exception
" Lineker v. Dillon, note 17, supra.
2 Lineker v. Dillon, note 17, supra.
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from the proviso in section 1, since by section 3 Congress withheld
from the several states the right, otherwise granted by the proviso in
section 1, to require federal court judgments and decrees to be con-
formed to the state system of recording or docketing judgments in
order to be effective as liens in the county in which rendered. In other
words, the judgment or decree of a federal court in any state should
be a lien on the debtor's property in the county wherein rendered
"in the same manner and to the same extent and under the same
conditions," by analogy, as if it were a judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction of the state, without, however, being registered, recorded,
docketed indexed, or the like, in any state office in that particular
county as a judgment of the state court should be under the state
law 25
One may infer from section 3 that Congress thought that the
records of a federal court in the county where it sat and rendered
judgments afforded a known and convenient means of information
of the existence of judgment liens of that court on property in that
county But the fact, apparently overlooked, was that United States
courts held sessions and rendered judgments in counties where only
temporary offices were maintained, no records of judgments being there
kept permanently, and no means being provided, therefore, for the
ascertainment in such counties of the liens of such judgments on
property therein. It is an entirely reasonable inference that it was
that condition of affairs which induced Congress to amend section 3
by the Act of March 2, 1895.26 This latter act was a re-enactment
of section 3 but with the addition thereto of a final clause reading,
"if the clerk of the United States court be required by law
to have a permanent office and a judgment record open at
all times for public inspection in such county or parish."
Manifestly, this amendment reduced the exceptions from the pro-
viso in section 1, thereby enlarging its scope, since section 3 as
amended excepted from the proviso in section 1 only those judg-
ments of United States courts rendered in counties in which the
clerks of those courts maintained permanent offices having records
of such judgments. Congress apparently still adhered to the view
that such records in those counties afforded a known and convenient
means for the ascertainment of the existence of the lien of federal
court judgments rendered therein.
"In re Jackson Ltght L Traction Co., note 1, supra.
' Act of March -, 1895, c. 180, 28 Stat. at L. 814.
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As thus amended the Act of August 1, 1888, remained unchanged
until the Act of August 17, 1912,27 which, by a provision therein,
took effect January 1, 1913. This act expressly and specifically re-
pealed section 3 of the Act of August 1, 1888. Next followed the
Act of August 23, 1916,28 which expressly and specifically repealed
section 3 of the Act of August 1, 1888, as amended by the Act of
March 2, 1895. And this Act of August 23, 1916, contained the
provision that it should take effect on January 1, 1917 What was
the result of the repeal Act of August 17, 1912, need not be dis-
cussed, not being material to our inquiry, since the subsequent Act of
August 23, 1916, on taking effect January 1, 1917 (long prior to
the coming into existence of any existing judgment lien in this state,
Washington), eliminated section 3, thereby abolishing the express
exceptions therein from the proviso in section 1. Therefore, since
January 1, 1917, only sections 1 and 2 of the Act of August 1, 1888,
have been in force and effect.
Let us now consider the Washington statute"- on this matter, which
(material part) reads:
"The real estate of any judgment debtor and such as he
may acquire, shall be held and bound to satisfy any judg-
ment of the district or circuit court of the United States,
if rendered in this state, or of the superior or supreme court
* * * for the period of five (5) years (made six by
later act) ° from the day on which said judgment was ren-
dered, and such judgments shall be a lien thereupon to com-
mence as follows: Judgments of the superior court of the
county in which real estate of the judgment debtor is situated
from the date of the entry thereof. Judgments of the dis-
trict or circuit courts of the United States, if rendered in
this state; judgments of the supreme court; judgments of
the superior court of any county other than the county in
which said judgment was rendered, from the time of the
filing and indexing of a duly certified transcript or abstract
of such judgments as provided by this act, with the clerk
of the county in which said real estate is situated."
This state act was passed (March 3, 1893) after the enactment of
the federal Act of August 1, 1888, and, no doubt, intended as a com-
pliance therewith. But, by its terms it included those judgments ex-
cepted by section 3 of the federal law; and to the extent that it required
7 Act of August 17, 1912, c. 300, 37 Stat. at L. 311.
Act of August -3, 1916, c. 397, 39 Stat. at L. 531.
Pierce's 1926 Code, § 8111, Rem. Comp. Stat § 445, Laws of 1893, p. 65.
Pierce's 1926 Code, § 8163; Rem. Comp. Stat., § 459.
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"the filing and indexing of a duly certified transcript or abstract" of a
federal court judgment in the county clerk's office of the county
wherein the judgment was rendered, this state law was inoperative and
of no effect, (but not otherwise void), 31 while section 3 was in force.
It operated upon federal judgments brought within the scope of sec-
tion 1 by the aforementioned amendment of March 2, 1895, and had
full operative effect after the repeal of section 3, provided that it does
not fail to comply in some essential particular with the terms and con-
ditions of the federal law,-the Act of March 1, 1888, as now in force.
Does this state statute comply therewith?
The Washington statute declares:
1. The liens of judgments and decrees of all courts, state and fed-
eral, subsist for six years from date of rendition, and therefore, estab-
lishes full and complete equality as to duration. A judgment is
"rendered" when the court announces its decision or signs the written
judgment. 3 2
2. Judgments of the "superior court of the county" wherein the
debtor's real estate is situated commence to be a lien from "date of the
entry thereof." A judgment is entered when the formal written
judgment, signed by the judge, is filed with the clerk.33 This gives
judgments of state superior courts effect as a lien in the county wherein
rendered, that is, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, from
date of entry of the judgment.
3. Judgments of all federal courts rendered in the state, judgments
of the state Supreme Court, and judgments of superior courts in counties
other than wherein rendered operate as a lien "from the time of filing
and indexing of a duly certified transcript or abstract" thereof "with
the county clerk of the county" in which the debtor's real estate is
situate. By this provision complete equality is given all the judgments
referred to.
The only apparent differentiation between state court and federal
court judgments by this Washington statute is in the rules giving judg-
31 Statutes requiring federal court judgments to be docketed, etc., enacted
prior to the Act of August 1, 1888, held merely inoperative until that federal
law took effect, then becoming effective; Dartmouth Savings Bank v. Bates,
note 3, supra, Blair v. Ostrander note 3, supra; Washington First Nat. Bk. v.
Clark, 55 Kan. 919, 40 Pac. 970 (1895).
1Quarales v. Seattle, 96 Wash. 226, 66 Pac. 389 (1901) Barlhrop v.
Tucker, 29 Wash. 666, 70 Pac. 120 (1902) State ex rel. Brown v. Brown, 31
Wash. 397, 79 Pac. 86, 69 L. R. A. 974 (1903) Morley v. Morley, 130 Wash
77, 926 Pac. 139 (1924).
See cases note 32, supra.
LIEN OF FEDERAL JUDGMENTS
ments effect as a lien in the county wherein rendered. In such cases
the judgments of the superior court in and for the county take effect
from date of entry; but judgments of federal courts from the time of
filing and indexing a certified transcript or abstract thereof in the
office of the county clerk. This latter rule applies to judgments of the
Supreme Court, so that federal court and Supreme Court judgments are
subject to the same requirements.
The only problems, therefore, which the statute presents relative to
the matter under discussion are: Whether the requirement that a certi-
fied transcript or abstract of a federal court judgment be filed with
the clerk of the county in which the judgment is rendered is authorized
by the federal Act of August 1, 1888? Whether there is discrimination
against judgments of federal courts ih the requirement that a certified
transcript or abstract thereof be filed with the clerk of the county in
which the judgments are entered and giving them effect as a lien from
the date of filing and indexing, while judgments of a superior court are
a lien in the county where rendered from date of entry thereof with
the clerk?
The provision last mentioned does not appear to effectuate any
actual discrimination. All judgments or transcripts of judgments must
be indexed,34 and though a judgment of a superior court is dedared a
lien within the jurisdiction of that court from the time of its entry,
yet it is doubtful if it is against a purchaser unless indexed. This is
the rule in other jurisdictions,35 and appears to be the law in this by
reason of the analogy of the judgment index system to that for deeds,
mortgages, and other title instruments, both systems having the same
object, and the rule which obtains in this state (Washington) relative
to the latter system, viz., that an instrument though duly filed or
recorded does not impart constructive notice or affect purchasers unless
indexed."
Again, there is no priority in Washington between or among judg-
ments or transcripts of judgments entered or filed the same day.37 All
" Pierce's 1926 Code, §§ 8115, 8116; Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 453, 446.
25 Gilbert v. Berry, 190 Ia. 170, 180 N. W 148 (1920), State Savngs Bk. V.
Shinn, 130 Ia. 365, 106 N. W 921, 114 Am. St. Rep. 424 (1906) tones v. Currie,
190 N. C. 260, 199 S. E. 605 (1925).
6itchte v. Grit/iths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 341, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155, 12 L. R.
A. 384 (1890). The rule stated in this case is the settled law in Iowa; Barney
v. Mc.Carty, 15 Ia. 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427 (1864), Koch v. West, 118 Ia. 468, 92
N. W 663, 96 Am. St. Rep. 394 (1902). Hence, the holding in Iowa that ajudgment must be indexed to be a lien as against bona fide purchasers, not
being founded on a statute expressly so declaring, but on the object of such
indexing, is a sound precedent in this (Washington) state.
'Goetztnger v. Rosenfeld, 16 Wash. 392, 47 Pac. 882, 38 L. R. A. 257(1897).
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are equal. Hence, the fact that a federal court judgment creditor may
be subjected, after entry of his judgment with the clerk of the federal
court, to what need be but a brief delay to obtain a certified transcript
or abstract of his judgment to file with the county clerk in the county
in which that judgment is rendered, cannot occasion him loss of prior-
ity, except in the possible rare instances where the federal court might
render judgment in too brief a time before the closing of the county
clerks office to permit that act to be performed. And even such in-
stances would not be of consequence unless there were one or more
judgments entered or transcripts of judgments filed against the debtor
on that same day
The issue presented has arisen and been determined in two cases,
both of which support the view that the Washington statute is valid
in the particular under consideration.
In Mississippi, the clerk of each state circuit court is required to
keep a judgment roll, in which, within twenty days after the adjourn-
ment of each term of court, he must enroll all final judgments rendered
at the term, in the order in which entered in the minutes of the court.
And the statute s (material part) declares:
"Sec. 607 A judgment so enrolled shall be a lien upon and
bind all the property of the defendant within the county where
so enrolled, from the rendition thereof, and shall have priority
according to the order of such enrollment " * *, and the
judgment shall not be a lien on any property of the defendant
thereto unless the same be enrolled, but in counties having
two districts a judgment shall operate as a lien only in the
district or districts in which it is enrolled."
"Sec. 609. A judgment or decree rendered in any court of
the United States or of this state shall not be a lien upon or
bind any property of the defendant situated out of the county
in which said judgment or decree was rendered, until the plain-
tiff shall file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the
county in which such property may be situated an abstract of
such judgment or decree, certified by the clerk of the court in
which the same was rendered, * * * and such judgment or
decree shall, from the date of its enrollment, be a lien upon
and bind the property of the defendants within the county
where it shall be so enrolled."
"Sec. 610. Judgments and decrees, at law or in equity,
rendered in any court of the United States held within this
state, or in the supreme court or the court of chancery of this
state, shall not be a lien upon, or bind the property of the de-
l Hening'way's Miss. Code (1917) §§ 606, 607, 609, 610.
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fendant within the county in which such judgments or de-
crees may be rendered, until an abstract thereof shall be filed
in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county and
enrolled on the judgment roll in like manner and on the same
terms hereinbefore provided, and such judgments and decrees
shall bind the property of the defendants from the date of such
enrollment, in like manner as judgments and decrees rendered
in a different county and so enrolled."
By this statute judgments become liens upon and have priority
according to their enrollment. In order that judgments and decrees
of United States courts, of the state court of chancery and of the
Supreme Court be liens within the county wherein rendered, or in any
other county, a certified abstract thereof must be filed with the circuit
court clerk of the county and enrolled on the judgment roll of his office.
But judgments and decrees of the circuit courts become liens in the
county where rendered by and from the time of enrollment, without
abstracts being filed, the latter being required, as well as enrollment,
only to extend the lien to other counties. Here, then, is a statute with
provisions similar in character to those in the Washington statute, and
making a like differentiation between federal court and state circuit
court (equivalent to superior court in Washington) judgments in re-
gard to the mode of giving them effect as liens in the county where
rendered.
In Mississippi, the issue was presented to the United States District
Court (S. Div.)ii whether a judgment of a federal court (rendered
May 10, 1918) which had been promptly enrolled in the office of the
clerk of that court, but not enrolled as required by the state law in
the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the
judgment was rendered and in which the debtor's property was situated,
was a lien. The judgment creditor conceded that, under the act of
1888, he had no lien on any property outside the county where the judg-
ment was rendered, but contended that the enrollment of the judg-
ment in the office of the clerk of the United States District Court was
sufficient to create a lien on the debtor's propertyi within that county.
But the District Court denied that contention, saying it rendered
meaningless the Act of August 23, 1916, repealing section 3 of the
Act of August 1, 1888, as amended by the Act of March 2, 1895, and
that:
"The court must give effect to section 3, while in force,
and attribute to Congress a substantial reason or motive for
repealing the same."
3 In re Jackson Light k Traction Co., note 1, supra.
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And, further, of the requirement of the state law that an abstract of
a federal judgment be filed and enrolled in the office of the state cir-
cuit court clerk's office in the county where such judgment is rendered,
the Court said.
Section 3 obviated the necessity of such enrollment, but the
repeal of section 3, * * * which became effective January 1,
1917, rendered the same procedure as to a federal court judg-
ment necessary in the same county where the judgment
rendered as was required in other counties of the state in order
to obtain a lien."
Accordingly, the judgment was held not to be a lien.
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals 0 (Fifth Circuit) sustained
the decision of the District Court. In its decision that appellate court
reviewed the federal and state statutes (heretofore quoted), and of
these said.
"The purpose of the foregoing provisions is quite plain.
They provide that judgments entered on the minutes of the
circuit court must be enrolled on the judgment roll in the
order of their rendition within 20 days after the adjourn-
ment of the term of court wherein rendered, and, when so
enrolled, shall be a lien from the rendition thereof, and shall
have priority according to the order of enrollment against
the judgment debtor and those claiming under him. A judg-
ment has no lien unless enrolled. In every case, except that
of a judgment in the court on whose records the enrollment
shall take place, even in the case of a circuit court of a differ-
ent judicial district in the same county, a judgment has a lien
only from the time when enrolled.
"As to every other state, or United States, court judg-
ment, where the same is not rendered in the court where the
enrollment takes place, it is the enrollment that gives the
lien and fixes its date. That act is the first entry of record
in the circuit court clerk's office of the existence of the judg-
ment, not so in the case of judgments rendered in such circuit
court. There the minutes in the clerks office would show
their existence, and the 'judgment roll' but indexes the existing
record, but even then the priority is to be 'in the order of
such enrollment.'
"We cannot see, therefore, where there is any discrimination
against the United States courts when they are put on the
same footing with the state supreme court, and every other
state court at law or in equity where the judgment is not
rendered in the same court on whose judgment roll an ab-
4DIn re ackson Light k Traction Co., note 1, stipra.
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stract must be enrolled in order to give it a lien on the
property of the judgment debtor."
The statute of Missouri declares:41
"Section 1554. Judgments and decrees obtained in the
Supreme Court, in any United States District or Circuit
court held within this state, in the Kansas City Court of
Appeals or the St. Louis Court of Appeals, shall, upon the
filing of a transcript thereof in the office of the clerk of
any circuit court, be a lien on the real estate of the person
against whom such judgment or decree is rendered, situated
in the county in which such transcript is filed."
"Section 1555. Judgments and decrees rendered by any
court of record shall be a lien on the real estate of the
person against whom they are rendered, situated in the county
for which the court is held."
"Section 1556. Such liens shall commence on the day of
the rendition of the judgment, and shall continue for three
years, subject to be revived as hereinafter provided, but when
two or more judgments or decrees are rendered at the same
term, as between the parties entitled to such judgments or
decrees, the lien shall commence on the last day of the
term at which they are rendered."
In a case in that state, a United States District Court having
rendered a pecuniary judgment, a transcript thereof was not filed in
the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of the county wherein the
judgment was rendered as required by the state law to create a lien
on the debtor's property in that county. The debtor owned property
in that county, whhic, after rendition of the judgment, she sold and
conveyed to defendant Smith. Thereafter, the judgment creditor
caused an execution sale to be made on his judgment of the property
to defendant Rhea, who obtained the marshal's deed thereof. There-
after, Rhea instituted suit against Smith to determine title to the
land, claiming the judgment was a lien from the time of its rendition,
and that his title under the execution sale was superior, therefore, to
any title of Smith. From a judgment for the latter, Rhea prosecuted
the appeal under consideration.
The Supreme Court of Missouri observed in this case,42 that there
are two federal districts, and three state courts of appeal districts
in that state, that a judgment of the Supreme Court of that state or
of the Kansas City Court of Appeals would not be a lien on property
within the county where rendered, unless a transcript thereof be
"1 Quoted in Rhea v. Smith, 308 Mo. 40, 272 S. W 9641 (1925).
'Rhea v. Smith, note 41, supra.
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filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of that county, as
the statute requires. Therefore, in that respect, United States courts
"are put on the same basis as the state courts having a
territorial jurisdiction more than the county."
To the argument of appellant that section 1554 supra of the state
law conflicted with the federal statute, the court replied, it would
if section 3 of the Federal Act of August 1, 1888, had not been re-
pealed. The court said.
"The act of Congress must be construed according to its
terms set out in sections 1 and 2, it must be construed with
reference to the repeal of section 3, and some significance
must be attached to the act of Congress in repealing that
section. Without that section, transcripts of judgments of
a federal court were required to be filed in the county rec-
ords where transcripts of judgments in state courts were re-
quired to be so filed. Section 3 relieved a judgment cred-
itor in the federal court from that requirement in a certain
instance. The repeal of the section shows an intent to make
that requirement.
"Having in view the purpose of repealing that provision
of the federal statute, we must construe its remaining pro-
visions. It provides that the judgments of federal courts,
within the state, 'shall be liens on property throughout such
state in the same manner and to the same extent and under
the same conditions only as if such judgments and decrees
had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of such
state.' It is evident that it was the intention by that statute
to place judgments of federal courts in the same position as
judgments of the state court, and not to give them any
advantage. The lien provided for is on property 'through-
out the state' in the same manner as judgments of a court
of general jurisdiction in the state. That would, of course,
apply to all property in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. When a judgment in the federal court is rendered
there is no distinction as to where the lien applies, between
the county where the court happens to sit and any other
county within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
"The appellant's argument proceeds upon the theory that
because the circuit court is the only state court of general
jurisdiction, and because the federal district and circuit
courts are courts of general jurisdiction, the filing of the
transcript in the county where the court sits may be omitted
in the case of a federal court the same as in the state circuit
court. Section 1555, R. S. 1919, does not provide for such
liens when a judgment is rendered by a court held in the
county It says that a judgment rendered by a court of
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record shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against
whom it is rendered, situated in the county for which, the
court is held, not 'in' which."
The court observed that a federal court sitting in one county is
not held "for" that county any more than for any other county in
its district. A federal court may hear a case in one county and
render its judgment in another; or hear part of the evidence in a
cause in one county, another part in some other county, render judg-
ment in a third, and pass upon a motion for rehearing in a fourth.
A federal court sits for its entire district, one county of which is
of as much importance as any other. And the Missouri Supreme
Court then declared.
"Apparently the intention was to place the federal courts
on an equality with the state courts of similar territorial
jurisdiction. Evidently it was the policy of the law to have
one definite place where a person might go to ascertain
whether there are any judgment liens affecting real estate in
which he might be interested, he would not have to go to
several places. To say that, in order to place the federal
district court on equality with the state court, a judgment of
that court must be a lien in the county where it is rendered
without filing the transcript with the clerk of the circuit
court, is to give that court an advantage over the state
circuit courts of every other county in that district. In the
Southern Division of the Western District of Missouri,
parties litigant come from counties in every part of the divi-
sion. Parties to litigation arising in a county distant from
where the court is held, upon rendition of a judgment would
have a lien in the county where the court is held, whereas
the same party, if the suit were pending in the state court
in the county where the cause originated, would not have
any such lien until a transcript of the judgment was filed.
For instance, suppose a party in Lawrence county should
sue a non-resident in the federal court, and judgment should
be rendered in Jasper county where the property of the
judgment defendant is. On the theory of the appellant, that
judgment would be a lien without the filing of a transcript.
Whereas, if another suitor in Lawrence county, having the
same kind of a case, should sue in the state court of Law-
rence county and obtain a judgment at the same time, he
could not have a lien on the property of the defendant in
Jasper county, until he had first filed his transcript. In
providing for equality between the judgment of federal
courts and state courts, so far as the lien is concerned, the
endeavor was to place them upon an equality with all the
state courts of general jurisdiction, and not merely with one
particular state court.
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"The alleged discrimination in favor of the state court
against a federal court, sitting in the same county, is only
apparent. The provision that the lien of a judgment shall
begin from its rendition means on the same day of its rendi-
tion. It would take but a short time to transcribe a judg-
ment of the federal court and file it with the clerk of the
state court on the day of its rendition, and thus put it on par
with the judgment of the state court rendered on the same
day "
So the judgment in issue was held not to have been a lien on the
debtor's property involved in the case.
That Congress itself considered section 1 of the Act of August 1,
1888, would authorize any state to require a federal court judgment
to be docketed and a transcript thereof to be filed in a state office
in the county in which rendered is evidenced by certain facts, viz..
(1) By the fact that the exercise of that authority was expressly
inhibited in section 3. Had Congress considered that section 1 did
not confer such power, the inhibition on the exercise of it would
have been deemed unnecessary (2) By the amendment of section 3
by the act of 1895. By this amendment Congress excluded from
section 3 all judgments rendered in counties in which a federal court
clerk did not keep a permanent office with a judgment record open
at all times for public inspection. The plain object of this amend-
ment was to remedy the hardships arising from the existence of liens
of federal court judgments on property in those counties without
record evidence therein of such liens. It is manifest that Congress
considered the provisions of section 1 applied to the judgments so
excluded from section 3, since otherwise the object or purpose of the
amendment would not have been accomplished, no other statute
having been applicable or made so.
Furthermore, to hold that the repeal of section 3 as amended did
not operate to make section 1 applicable to the judgments referred
to in section 3 as amended,-did not abolish the inhibition imposed
by the latter section,-would not only be inconsistent with the facts
above noted, but would restore the condition which the act of 1895
was passed to remedy For such holding would now give, under
the Act of August 1, 1888, as it now stands, those judgments of a
federal court rendered in a county in which the clerk of that court
has no permanent office with records of judgments, effect as a lien
on property in that county without any record therein of such lien.
This is necessarily so, because the Act of August 1, 1888, as it now
stands does not differentiate between judgments of a federal court
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rendered in a county wherein the clerk of that court has a permanent
office and those rendered in a county in which he does not. Such
differentiation was made by the amendment of 1895 only, and was
abolished by the repeal of section 3 so as amended. The holding
mentioned, therefore, cannot with reason be sustained.
It appears, therefore, that the repeal of section 3 ought to be con-
strued as evidence of the intention of Congress that section 1 should
apply to all federal court judgments; that to require the docketing of
a judgment of a United States court, or the filing of a transcript
thereof, in any state office in the same county in which the judgment
is rendered, in order that it be a lien on property therein, is within
the scope of the authority granted by section 1.4
The written judgment of a court is an essential part of the records
of that court, and cannot be properly used to make a record else-
where. For such purpose a transcript or abstract, certified as to
authenticity and correctness, is necessary. This is the available means
to effectuate the record of a federal court judgment in a state office
in the county wherein the judgment is rendered. To require, there-
fore, the use of such means for that purpose in order to establish the
lien of such judgments cannot be said to be a discrimination against
those judgments on the ground that judgments of state courts ren-
dered in the same county become a lien on their entry. The differ-
ence being merely in the incidental means required to bring about the
conformity sought by the Act of August 1, 1888, it does not appear
to be material, since it does not defeat conformity to the record
system applicable to all judgments, nor defeat equality of liens be-
tween creditors to federal and state court judgments.
The Washington law does not bring about the discrimination
which rendered a former California statute wholly invalid. 44  Under
that statute state court judgments became a lien in the county where
rendered on being docketed, and in other counties on filing a tran-
script with the county recorder. But transcripts or copies, possibly
both (the statute was ambiguous) of federal court judgments, cer-
tified by the clerk of the court, had to be filed with and docketed by
the county clerk, and also filed with, recorded and indexed by the
county recorder, in every county, even that in which the judgment
was rendered, and the judgment became a lien "from such recording."
"This repeal stressed as showing such intent in In re Jackson Light
Traction Co., note 1, supra, and Rhea v. Smith, note 41, supra.
"Lineker v. Dillon, 975 Fed. 460, 473 et seq. (1921).
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Manifestly, this statute did not conform federal court judgments to
the rules and requirements governing the creation and evidencing of
state court judgment liens. The former judgments were not put on
an equal footing with the latter. Hence, the statute was held
inapplicable to judgments of the United States courts.4"
In conclusion the writer submits that the provisions of the Wash-
ington statute prescribing the mode by which judgments of courts
of the United States may be given effect as liens are valid, and
must be complied with to accomplish that result.
F C. Hackman.*
Seattle, Washington.
*Ltneker v. Dillon, note 44, supra.
* Of the Seattle Bar, formerly Associate Editor of LAWYER AND BANKER,
1921-23.
